With market complexity and uncertainty intensifying, enterprises are more inclined to adopt cooperative innovation to strengthen their technological innovation capability. Cooperative innovation often involves a large number of upstream and downstream enterprises with their decision-making differences. Based on this, the decision process is divided into: deciding research and development(R&D) investment and determining the final two stages of commodity output. This paper builds different rational levels of upstream and downstream R&D cooperative investment decision-making model. The existence and stability of the system's equilibrium point and the effect of R&D investment adjustment speed on the system state are discussed based on the analysis of the asymmetry and bounded rationality of R&D efficiency of the upstream and downstream enterprises.
INTRODUCTION
With the shortening of product life cycle and the increase of uncertainty of market demand, new technology research and development is getting more complicated, in the case of enterprises being limited by their own innovation resources, it is obviously unrealistic to achieve technical progress relying on independent innovation. In this context, enterprises tend to seek external help to cooperate in R&D, so as to reduce innovation cost. Currently, the research on enterprise cooperative R&D is mainly focused on the horizontal cooperative innovation among enterprises, and the research on the vertical chain innovation of upstream and downstream enterprises is less without enough depth. However, in practice, as the final product from R&D to output often involves more than one upstream and downstream enterprise, leading to the difference existing in the investment decision of cooperative R&D for the upstream and downstream enterprises, it is necessary to discuss how to determine the R&D investment in the chain innovation by multi enterprises (Chesbrough, 2003; D'aspremont and Jacquemin,1988; Suetens,2005; Brod and Shivakumar, 1999; Kim, 2000) .
In horizontal cooperative innovation, the upstream and downstream enterprises share the innovation achievement, and the innovation cost to reduce the R&D risks. The research of foreign scholar Harhoff shows that the upstream enterprises can promote the downstream enterprises to increase output and increase the demand for intermediate goods through the improvement of innovation investment and technology spillover; Ishii discussed the cooperative innovation modes of two upstream enterprises and two downstream enterprises under the technological externality; and Steurs pointed out that the vertical technology spillover is more conducive to promoting the innovation investment of each enterprise. Huo Penjun and Xuan Guoliang, domestic scholars, started to focus on the investment issue in cooperation innovation for the upstream and downstream enterprises earlier; research of Huang Bo et al indicated that the cooperation in R&D phase is conducive for the upstream and downstream enterprises to increase their R&D investments; Liu Zhiying and Li Qinqin discussed the cooperation mode of enterprises in the industry chain as the downstream enterprises carrying out technological innovation, pointed out that cooperative innovation can achieve a win-win situation, and further analyzed the allocation problem on profit and innovation cost; research of Li Weihong et al discovered that the output, profit innovation investments level for horizontal and vertical cooperative innovations simultaneously carried by the downstream enterprises are all superior to the single horizontal cooperation form (Harhoff,1996; Ishii,2004; Steurs,1995; Huo and Xuan,2000; Huang and Meng and Li,2008; Liu and Li,2012; Li and Chen and Wang,2012) .
In above mentioned literatures, all enterprises are involved in the game and make decisions under the assumption of complete rationality. However, in real economic activities, it cannot be completely rational for enterprises to make decisions under the constraints of objective conditions, but of bounded rationality. In addition, under the influence of enterprise's own innovation ability and regional difference, there are also asymmetry factors like initial cost, innovation efficiency, technology spillover level and so on among enterprises. On the basis of investigation of Bischi, Sheng Zhaohan, et al, Hu Rong and Zhang Jixiang analyzed the influence of technology spillover effects on double oligopoly competition of different rational level, the investigation showed that the influence of technology spillover on R&D investment and profit of double oligopoly is significant, however, the asymmetry of the innovation efficiency between enterprises is not taken into consideration; Vandekerckhove studied R&D cooperation under the condition of asymmetrical technology spillover; consideration of Sun Caihong, et al. is much more comprehensive, under the premise of initial cost, innovation efficiency and spillover level, discussed the influence of technology spillover on each input and output during R & D cooperation of the enterprises (Hu and Chen and Wang,2010; Chen and Yi,2012; Bondt and Henriques ,1995; Bischi and Lamantia,2004; Sheng and Li and Chen and Du,2006; Huand Zhang,2012; Vandekerckhove,2008) .
However, many researchers and scholars carried out the research base on horizontal technology spillover between enterprises with ignoring the vertical technology spillover of between enterprises, and the coexistence phenomenon of the horizontal and vertical technology spillover often occurs in the real economic activities.In fact, Sun Xiaohua and Zheng Hui had ever discussed the innovation investment of each enterprise under the condition that there are horizontal, vertical technology spillover or both of them, but did not take the bounded rationality of enterprises into the model. For this reason, an economic system composed of an upstream supplier and two downstream producers was taken I nto consideration on the basis of AJ Model in this paper, under the premise of asymmetry R&D efficiency between the upstream and downstream enterprises, incorporated the bounded rationality into the model, and discussed existence and stability of equilibrium point of the system through analytical solution, as well as the influence of enterprise R&D investment adjusting rate on the state of the system (Sun and Zheng,2012) .
R&D COOPERATIVE INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING MODEL CONSTRUCTION
Suppose there are an upstream enterprise S and two downstream enterprises 12 ， DD in the market, the two downstream enterprises have the same rational level, but have rational difference with the upstream enterprise. The downstream enterprises change intermediate goods supplied by the upstream enterprise into the final product and to sell to consumers at a price of P , and one unit of intermediate goods can only be changed into one unit of final product through the downstream enterprises, i.e. total outputs are equal for upstream and downstream enterprises. Set the inverse demand function for the downstream enterprise as ( ) ( )  and Jacquemin,1988; . Amir,2000) .
In order to pursue profit maximization, enterprises carry out the R&D of new technologies to reduce output costs. The R&D investment of the upstream enterprise is () . According to the above mentioned assumptions, output cost functions of the three enterprises are as follows:
Unit output cost of the downstream enterprises during period t :
Unit output cost of the upstream enterprise during period t :
The profit function of the upstream and downstream enterprises during period t can be expressed as:
To ensure the output cost of each enterprise through new technology R&D is positive, , ds AA shall meet following conditions:
Decision of the upstream and downstream enterprises is divided into two stages based on Suetens' literature: the first stage, R&D investment is determined by the upstream and downstream enterprises; the second stage, the upstream and downstream enterprises decide the output of final commodity. Using the reverse induction method to solve the final commodity output decided by the downstream enterprises respectively during period t , which objective is to maximize profits. Finding the derivative to 12 ( ), ( ) dd q t q t respectively through formula (5) (6) and making it equal to 0, we can obtain:
Total output of final commodity of the downstream enterprises during period t is 12 ( ) ( ) ( )
then the unit price of upstream product is:
Output of commodity of the upstream enterprise during period t can be obtained by finding the derivative to () s Qtthrough formula (4):
From the previous hypothesis we know that total output of the upstream and downstream enterprises
Q t Q t q t q t , and intermediate goods pricing of the upstream enterprise is obtained as follows:
Output of the downstream enterprises during period t can be obtained as follows: 2( ) (7 3 ) ( ) (9 5) ( ) 2( 1) ( ) () 12
2( ) (9 5) ( ) (7 3 ) ( ) 2( 1) ( ) () 12 
R&D investment is determined by the upstream and downstream enterprises in the first stage. Atallah divides the cooperative mode among enterprises into four types: non-cooperation, horizontal cooperation, vertical cooperation and mixed cooperation. Only the mixed cooperation mode of enterprise is analyzed here due to limited space, and other three modes can by researched by similar method. In this case, R&D investment decision of the enterprise makes the joint profit the most. Marginal profits of the upstream and downstream enterprises can be obtained as follows (Atallah ,2002 ( ) 1 ( )(3 1) (9 6 5 9 ) ( ) 4(3 1) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( ) ( ) 9 ( ) 1 ( )(3 1) 4(3 1) ( ) (9 6 5 9 ) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( ) ( ) 9
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Then, R&D investment of the upstream enterprise during period t is:
As there is rational difference between the upstream and downstream enterprises, R&D investment decisions of the enterprises of different rational level are also different. Suppose that two downstream enterprises have bounded rationality, the upstream business has simple rationality. Following the hypothesis on limited rational enterprises in literature [14 18 19] , it is considered that limited rational enterprises decide R&D investment of the enterprise and ensure profit maximization depending on marginal profit signal, and there is historical relativity between the two stages of R&D investment, i.e.: () ( 1) ( ) ( )(3 1) (9 6 5 9 ) ( ) 4(3 1) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( ) 9 () ( 1) ( ) ( )(3 1) 4(3 1) ( ) (9 6 5 9 ) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( ) 9 4( ) ( 1) 
R&D COOPERATIVE INVESTMENT DECISION-MAKING MODEL ANALYSIS
Based on the significance of economic model, only nonnegative equilibrium solutions are effective, so only the non-negative situation of equilibrium solutions of the system (21) are studied in this paper. In the system (21) ( )(3 1) (9 6 5 9 ) ( ) 4(3 1) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( ) 0 ( )(3 1) 4(3 1) ( ) (9 6 5 9 ) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( ) 0
And nonnegative equilibrium of the system (21) can be obtained:
(3 1) 4 ( 1) 9 (3 1) 4 ( 1)
Equilibrium point * E is a Nash equilibrium point, points 0 1 2 ， ， E E E are bounded equilibrium points (boundary solutions of two downstream producers are identical, so only the boundary solution of producer 1 D will be discussed), in order to study the stability of equilibrium points, each balanced Jacobian Matrix can be calculated through system (21): ( 1)(3 1) ( , , ) 99 2( 1)(3 1) 2( 1)(3 1) 0 9 4( 1) 9 4( 1)
Where, 12 2 1 1 [( )(3 1) 2(9 6 5 9 ) ( ) 4(3 1) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( )] 9
[( )(3 1) 4(3 1) ( ) 2(9 6 5 9 ) ( ) ( 1)(3 1) ( )] 9 4 ( 1) 2( 1)(3 1) 2( 1)(3 1) 0 9 4( 1) 9 4( 1)
Considering that R&D investment of the enterprise is non negative, following theorem can be obtained: Theorem 1: For discrete dynamical system (21), as 
Then the necessary condition of matrix (23) 9(9 6 5 9 ) 9(9 6 5 9 ) ( )(3 1)(
) ( ) 0 0 9 6 5 9 2( 1)(3 1) 2( 1)(3 1) 1 4( 1) 9 4( 1) 9 
) 0 9(9 6 5 9 ) ( ) (3 1) ( ( 1) )[2 ( 1) 4 (3 1) ( ( 1) )(9 2( 1) )] 0 (9 6 5 9 ) (9 4( 1) )
In the above mentioned formula, there are four situations for each order principal minor determinants being positive, but considering the non-negative of R&D investment of the enterprise, we can obtain through calculation: 
4( 1) 9 1 ( 1) 2 (3 1) ( ( 1) )(9 2( 1) ) 2
In the same way, bounded equilibrium point 2 E can be discussed by the same method for 1 E . Through calculation we can obtain: Following is the calculation of Jacobian Matrix at Nash equilibrium point * E : 2 2 * 22 (9 6 5 9 ) 4 (3 1) (3 1)( 1) 1 4 (3 1) (9 6 5 9 ) (3 1)( 1) ( ) 1 2( 1)(3 1) 2( 1)(3 1) 0 9 4( 1) 9 4( 1)
Where: asymmetric R&D efficiency, and the existence and stability of the system's equilibrium point and the effect of R&D investment adjustment speed on the system state are discussed by analytic analysis. This paper incorporates R&D efficiency asymmetry and bounded rationality of upstream and downstream enterprises into the model, making the model closer to real economic activities, which lays the foundation for the next step to make the simulation.
